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Election Day every year is one of the most important days for Americans; 
oftentimes, the stakes are high, and hotly contested elections generate anxiousness 
and uncertainty. Imagine in the time leading up to Election Day, a local party 
official engages in a number of steps with the purpose of diluting the vote of a 
particular racial group. The scheme is elaborate and well orchestrated. He 
intentionally recruits poll workers who belong to one racial group; he blatantly 
disregards the law governing the counting and validation of absentee ballots, and 
he purposely solicits nonresidents, ineligible to hold office, to run in local 
 
* Third-year law student at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. I would like to thank 
my faculty advisor Professor Richard Hasen for his tremendously detailed and helpful support 
throughout this process as well as my colleagues at the UC Irvine Law Review for their efforts in 
making this publication possible.  
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elections. The official does all of this to promote the interests and the visibility of 
his own racial group.  
In a country that prides itself on constantly striving toward racial progress, 
this sort of egregious conduct plainly violates contemporary notions of racial 
fairness. It also happens to violate the law. Existing statutes like the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) contain provisions that protect against such pernicious 
discrimination. In particular, Section 2 of the VRA protects voting rights by 
prohibiting any state or locality from imposing a voting qualification, prerequisite 
to voting, standard, practice, or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment 
of the right of any U.S. citizen to vote on account of race or color based on a 
totality of the circumstances test.1 Interestingly, courts and commentators have yet 
to explore in robust detail whether this statutory provision affords protections 
only for voters of color, as Congress arguably intended when it passed the 
legislation, or if it applies equally to white Americans as well. One federal circuit 
has assumed that white voters fall under the statute’s ambit with little explanation.2 
Additionally, the rare application of Section 2 to white voters, in light of a long 
history of consistent application to voters of color, might raise some novel 
questions in practice. The question of whether the VRA applies to white voters 
warrants further academic inquiry.  
This question is particularly timely because of the dynamic and 
contemporary nature of race relations, and where they are likely to proceed in the 
future. Race relations have changed since the passage of the VRA in 1965.3 
Commentators have observed heightened discomfort among white Americans as 
shifting racial demographics jeopardize their majority status in this country.4 
Amidst amplified racial tensions, recent allegations of white voter intimidation in 
Philadelphia on Election Day 2008 and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
handling of the situation—from initially investigating and pressing charges to then 
dropping many of them—have plagued the Obama administration.5 The DOJ’s 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2011). The totality of the circumstances test means that courts look at 
what is generally regarded as “the Senate factors” to help determine whether Section 2 has been 
violated. These factors—taken from a Senate judiciary committee report—include racially polarized 
voting, official history of discrimination in voting, racial appeals in political campaigns, etc. See generally 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36–38 (1986).  
2. United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 432 (5th Cir. 2009). 
3. Orlando Patterson, Race and Diversity in the Age of Obama, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Aug. 16, 
2009, at 23; Susan Saulny, Census Data Presents Rise in Multiracial Population of Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2011, at A3; Sabrina Tavernise, In Census, Minorities Show Gains in Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011, 
at A10. For a general description of changes in race relations in American history, see Douglas S. 
Massey, The Past & Future of American Civil Rights, DÆDALUS, Spring 2011, at 37, 37–54. For 
commentary on equal protection legal principles in light of shifting racial dynamics, see Mario L. 
Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010).  
4. Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Roots of White Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2010, at A21; see also 
Hua Hsu, The End of White America?, ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2009, available at http://www.theatlantic. 
com/magazine/archive/2009/01/the-end-of-white-america/7208. 
5. Charlie Savage, Racial Motive Alleged in a Justice Dept. Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010, at 
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application of Section 2 in that case to white voters was controversial even with 
seasoned career attorneys in the Voting Section of the DOJ’s Civil Rights 
Division.6 Underlying the inherently messy and political nature of the incident is 
the question of whether white Americans, too, are protected under the statute. 
The stakes for this question are high. First, if the VRA only protects voters 
of color, some might be concerned that such an interpretation would negatively 
impact the progress of race relations in America. With the 2008 election of 
President Barack Obama, there is at least an illusion that U.S. race relations are 
improving. Although white voters have not filed many claims in the past, the 
changing face of America increases the likelihood that this will change. Second, 
protecting only voters of color runs contrary to our notions of basic fairness. It 
contradicts our cultural norms of treating everyone the same regardless of race. 
Finally, an interpretation that applies Section 2 of the Act to white voters will help 
ensure its constitutionality—a critical move given the number of past and pending 
constitutional challenges to Section 5 of the VRA, a provision that requires certain 
jurisdictions to “preclear” their election-related changes with the Attorney General 
or before a three-judge panel in the district court for the District of Columbia.7 
The VRA is regarded as one of the most important civil rights statutes in our 
country’s history, and how to protect it from constitutional challenge is a timely 
and important question. With the U.S. Supreme Court possibly declaring Section 5 
unconstitutional in the foreseeable future, a robust Section 2 on which voting 
rights attorneys may rely is crucial. Yet, there is a possibility that critics of Section 
5—or others—may also find Section 2 constitutionally questionable, resurrecting 
unsuccessful constitutional challenges of the past.8 Constitutional concerns aside, 
allowing white voters to bring claims under the VRA likely would mitigate political 
concerns, its application seen perhaps as a natural consequence of a racially 
complicated America, whereas barring white voters from the Act’s protections 
might only fuel hostility, spark political concerns, and raise the possibility of social 
turmoil.  
In this Note, I argue that courts should interpret Section 2 of the VRA to 
protect all voters, regardless of race. This is what I will refer to as a “broad” 
interpretation of Section 2.9 A dynamic and broad interpretation—as opposed to a 
 
A11. For a detailed report issued as a result of an investigation, see U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
RACE NEUTRAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW? THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE NEW 
BLACK PANTHER PARTY LITIGATION, AN INTERIM REPORT (2010). 
6. Jerry Markon & Krissah Thompson, Black Panther Case Reveals Schism, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 
2010, at A1. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
8. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo Cnty. 
Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984). 
9. A broad interpretation of the VRA is not necessarily the same as a “colorblind” VRA. The 
first recognizes the importance of race while protecting all people, while the latter may potentially 
require race to be excluded as a factor entirely.  
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narrow interpretation that protects only black voters or voters of color—ensures 
its continuing constitutionality and helps address upcoming voting rights issues of 
an increasingly racially dynamic and fluid country. To substantiate these claims, in 
Part I, I employ traditional tools of statutory interpretation to examine Section 2, 
observing that while the legislative history arguably indicates a Congressional 
intent to guarantee the enfranchisement of minority voters, other traditional tools 
of statutory interpretation, like textual analysis, examining statutes in pari materia, 
and the canon of constitutional avoidance favor applying Section 2’s protections 
to all voters. Part II offers policy reasons for a broad interpretation of Section 2, 
including factors such as basic fairness, the existence of officially unrecognized 
minority groups, and ensuring the Act’s ongoing constitutionality. Finally, Part III 
considers how a broad interpretation would work in practice, noting potential 
problem areas and positing possible solutions.10 
I. THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND 
TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Statutory interpretation is the logical place to begin when analyzing a 
statute’s ambit. This Part examines the VRA’s history, the plain language of 
Section 2, the VRA’s legislative history and congressional intent arguments, 
statutes in pari materia, and the canon of constitutional avoidance. 
A. The History Behind the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
The significance of the history behind a legislative enactment to exercises of 
statutory interpretation is well established.11 Therefore, the appropriate place to 
begin the analysis is with the history of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. This historical 
summary is offered to paint a contextual picture of the circumstances that led to 
the Act’s adoption.12  
The 1965 Voting Rights Act originated from a long and pervasive history of 
 
10. I cabin my analysis to Section 2 because the inclusion of Section 5 necessarily presents 
complex, difficult issues that are separate and outside of the scope of inquiry. For example, because 
Section 5 is used in covered jurisdictions to make sure that election changes do not have an intent or 
the effect of retrogression on minority voting, how the provision would apply to white voters is 
unclear. 
11. See, e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979) (“[C]ourts, in construing 
a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed; and this is 
frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in 
it.”) (citing United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875)); see also Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (including, within the analysis of the Supreme Court’s anti-messiness doctrine, a 
legislative history as a factor in statutory construction).  
12. For a detailed review of the two decades leading up to the VRA’s passage, see DAVID J. 
GARROW, Black Voters and the Federal Voting Rights Enforcement Effort in the South, 1940–1964, in 
PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, 6, 6–30 
(1979). 
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disenfranchisement of freed slaves in America. During the Reconstruction Era 
after the Civil War, Congress passed a series of constitutional amendments 
attempting to guarantee the rights of recently freed slaves, including the Fifteenth 
Amendment,13 which prohibited a voting qualification based on race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude in the United States.14 Although the Amendment 
passed in 1870, in the years following its ratification, states went to great measures 
to disenfranchise black Americans. Four prominent examples of the many 
mechanisms that states employed were white primaries, grandfather clauses, 
literacy tests, and poll taxes.15 For example, between 1927 and 1953, the Supreme 
Court struck down four attempts by Texas to prevent black Americans from 
voting in primaries.16 Sometimes, the mechanisms were combined to effectuate 
even stronger disenfranchisement. One example was Oklahoma, which combined 
literacy tests and grandfather clauses as conditions of voting; these practices were 
challenged in Guinn v. United States.17 Meanwhile, poll taxes required voters to pay a 
nominal tax as a prerequisite condition. Many argued that this disproportionately 
affected black Americans, who often could not afford the tax. The Supreme Court 
eventually struck down poll taxes as violations of equal protection.18 
Judicial action was often too little, too late. Although the Supreme Court 
ultimately did strike down many of these states’ mechanisms, the challenges first 
were heard in openly resistant and skeptical district courts and courts of appeals, 
which often strained to rule in favor of the states.19 Furthermore, proponents of 
these devices often successfully claimed that they were not in violation of the 
 
13. The Fifteenth Amendment is entitled “Universal Male Suffrage.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV. Section 1 reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.” Id. § 1. Section 2 reads: “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.” Id. § 2.  
14. Women received the right to vote with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1919. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
15. For a thorough treatment of white primaries and the cases the Supreme Court decided 
about them, see Ellen Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (2004). For a general 
overview of black disenfranchisement in light of the Fifteenth Amendment, see Benno C. Schmidt, 
Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 3: Black Disenfranchisement 
from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982). 
16. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).  
17. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). Over forty years later, the Supreme Court 
considered literacy tests alone in Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).  
18. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Poll taxes were also 
attacked in other ways. See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The 
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2009). 
19. DERRICK BELL, Voting Rights and Democratic Domination, in RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN 
LAW, 341, 353 (2008) (“Litigation protesting the disenfranchisement provisions and the white 
primaries was filed in state and federal courts. The decisions, in the main, upheld the rights of states 
to fashion their own suffrage provisions . . . . [M]ost disenfranchisement devices were allowed to 
stand.”). 
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as the statutes that enacted many of these 
devices either did not constitute state action or were facially race-neutral. Even if 
the Supreme Court ultimately reversed a state’s racist mechanisms (and the 
Supreme Court was not always the most reliable and consistent advocate for black 
Americans’ voting rights20), little could be done retroactively for disenfranchised 
black voters given the inherently time-sensitive nature of elections. Except in the 
rare order for a new election—which raises its own set of difficult questions—
courts lacked the ability to protect voting rights violations ex-post.  
It is against this backdrop of state subversion of constitutional mandates that 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Since the language of the 
Fifteenth Amendment expressly allowed for Congressional enforcement via 
appropriate legislation, the legislature took the opportunity to effectuate the 
enfranchisement of black Americans in southern jurisdictions. Responding to the 
many state mechanisms used to deprive blacks of their vote, the 1965 Act 
affirmatively banned the use of tests or devices in determining voter eligibility,21 
explicitly authorized the Attorney General to challenge state poll taxes,22 and even 
allowed for the possibility of court-appointed federal observers in elections to 
ensure compliance with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.23  
Perhaps most importantly, the VRA contained two provisions that continue 
to have utmost importance today: Sections 2 and 5. The former creates a cause of 
action for voting rights violations of the VRA, and the latter imposes restrictions 
on local election officials planning to change election procedures. Section 2 as 
written now prohibits any state or local voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, 
standard, practice, or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of the 
right of any U.S. citizen to vote on account of race or color based on a totality of 
the circumstances test;24 Congress added the totality of the circumstances test to 
Section 2 during the 1982 reauthorization after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mobile v. Bolden.25 This amendment was significant; before 1982, Section 2 was 
hardly ever invoked in its original form, and after 1982 it became the primary way 
to challenge vote dilution.26 Vote dilution is generally defined as practices that 
 
20. As the Supreme Court struck down poll taxes and white primaries, it upheld the 
constitutionality of literacy tests. See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 4.  
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b.  
22. Id. § 1973h.  
23. Id. § 1973a(a); id. § 1973f.  
24. Id. § 1973 (2011).  
25. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). For an in-depth look at the 1982 amendment to 
Section 2, see Roy A. McKenzie & Ronald A. Krauss, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An Analysis of the 
1982 Amendment, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (1984). 
26. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006). 
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have the effect of depriving minority voters of an equal opportunity to elect a 
candidate of choice.27  
Section 2’s sister provision, Section 5, requires certain jurisdictions—
determined by a particular coverage formula28—to “preclear,” or seek advance 
approval of, any new voting qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or 
procedure it wishes to establish, by either instituting an action in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, or seeking approval from the Attorney 
General.29 Section 5 is a temporary measure and subject to Congressional 
reauthorization regularly after a set period of time.30  
Section 2 is one of the core provisions of the VRA. Scholars cite Section 2 as 
largely instrumental to the rapid enfranchisement of black southerners in a matter 
of years.31 In Mobile, the Court held that Section 2 claims required an “invidious 
purpose” showing because its sole purpose was to effect the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Congress responded to Mobile by amending the statute to eliminate a 
purposeful discrimination requirement and to employ the current totality of the 
circumstances—a results-oriented—test.32 This language makes Section 2 one of 
the most powerful remedies in a voting rights case, so the argument mostly rests 
with the post-1982 amendment.  
The VRA called for a greater role for the federal government, particularly the 
Attorney General and federal courts, in state and local elections. Because of this 
increased oversight and subsequent southern hostility to federal interference, the 
VRA—particularly Section 5—was immediately subject to a series of 
constitutional challenges.33 Since its enactment, the VRA has survived one 
constitutional challenge after another in our country’s high court.34 In Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder35 (NAMUDNO), the most 
recent Supreme Court VRA case and the first constitutional challenge since the 
2006 reauthorization, the Court avoided the question of the VRA’s 
constitutionality and instead resolved the claim on statutory grounds. Even so, 
 
27. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Redistricting & Vote Dilution, REDRAWING THE 
LINES, http://www.redrawingthelines.org/redistrictingvotedilution (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
29. Id. 
30. See id. § 1973b(a)(8) (extending the provisions for another twenty-five years from the 2006 
reauthorization date). 
31. Katz et al., supra note 26.  
32. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000)). 
33. The first of these challenges the Supreme Court entertained was South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), where the Court upheld the “inventive” manner that Congress chose 
to exercise its authority, saying that “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the 
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.” Id. at 324.  
34. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282–85 (1999); City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 173–78 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531–32 (1973).  
35. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
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NAMUDNO seriously called into question the Act’s constitutionality; 
commentators have predicted that the opinion is a sign that the high court will 
eventually strike down the VRA in another constitutional challenge.36 Despite the 
challenges, the VRA has established itself as a legitimate and continuing presence 
in American electoral politics, and some commentators have even hailed the VRA 
as “one of the most remarkable and consequential pieces of congressional 
legislation ever enacted.”37  
B. The Plain Language of Section 2 
With the question of whom the statute is designed to protect as the focus, 
this Subpart analyzes Section 2’s plain language. The plain language38 of the 
provision supports a broad reading of the VRA that includes voters of all racial 
backgrounds.  
Subsection (a) of the 1982 amendment to Section 2 banned any practice or 
procedure that results in the denial or infringement of the “right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color.”39 The words “any citizen” 
and “on account of race or color ”  clearly mean that Section 2’s protections apply 
broadly to all voters, leaving the protections as broad as possible. The statute does 
not specify a particular racial identity it seeks to protect, leaving the statute as a 
remedy in voting rights cases for all races. Nothing in the language suggests that a 
citizen whose vote was either denied or abridged as a result of a state practice or 
procedure need be a black American or other person of color in order to file a 
claim for relief.  
The text of subsection (b) reaffirms this reading of the statute. Subsection (b) 
defines a violation of subsection (a) using a totality of the circumstances test that 
shows the political processes are not open to “members of a class of citizens 
 
36. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Down the Memory Hole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at 
A31. 
37. Katz et al., supra note 26, at 644. 
38. Section 2 reads: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in 
section 1973b(f ) (2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members 
of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members 
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in 
this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers 
equal to their proportion in the population. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b). 
39. Id. § 1973(a). 
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protected by subsection (a)” and lists one consideration as the extent to which 
members “of a protected class”  have been elected to office.40 The use of “class” in 
these sentences signals a level of generality that looks beyond specific racial 
identities as a basis for offering protection. Indeed, the term “protected class” is a 
legal term of art that has longstanding significance and has been interpreted 
broadly in Supreme Court jurisprudence. For example, in the 1996 case of 
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,41 Justice Scalia wrote about protected 
classes in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 
1967. The meaning of the term of art can be traced as far back as 1973 in 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,42 where the Supreme Court interpreted Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.43 These cases interpreted the legal principle 
behind “protected class” as focusing on not a particular identity group, like 
African Americans, men, or underage youth, but on broader immutable traits 
protected under the law, like race, gender, or age. The O’Connor Court’s 
interpretation of the ADEA is particularly illustrative on this point, holding “[t]he 
discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is discrimination because of [an] 
individual’s age though the prohibition is limited to individuals who are at least 40 
years of age.”44 The Court explained, “This language does not ban discrimination 
against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination against 
employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those who are 40 
or older.”45  
Based on the reasoning in O’Connor, when Congress passed the VRA in 1965, 
it could have banned discrimination on account of race in voting, and 
subsequently limited the class of individuals only to black Americans or voters of 
color. Congress did not specify any racial categories when it passed the 1982 
amendment, and it again remained silent on this question during the most recent 
2006 reauthorization. Therefore, the plain language of Section 2 bolsters a broad 
interpretation that offers the provision’s protections to all voters. 
C. Legislative History and Congressional Intent 
This section looks to the Act’s legislative history through the congressional 
record for the 1965 passage, the 1982 amendment to Section 2, and the most 
recent 2006 reauthorization. The legislative history is the most adequate proxy for 
 
40. Id. § 1973(b). 
41. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309–10 (1996).  
42. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973). 
43. Some commentators have even traced protected classes to the early 1900s. See, e.g., Robert 
C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REV. 367, 370 
(2003) (citing Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 (1907)).  
44. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45. Id.  
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congressional intent.46 Congressional intent is perhaps the most important factor 
in statutory construction.47  
The legislative history of the VRA arguably compels a more narrow 
interpretation because all of the sources indicate that Congress contemplated the 
Voting Rights Act to operate in the context of black Americans’ and language 
minorities’ voting rights.  
For the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Committee on the 
Judiciary issued a report accompanying the House bill speaking to the long history 
of difficulties our country experienced in its responsibility to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment. It wrote,  
The history of the Fifteenth Amendment litigation in the Supreme Court 
reveals both the variety of means used to bar Negro voting and the 
durability of such discriminatory policies. . . .  
 The past decade has been marked by an upsurge of public 
indignation against the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the polls 
that characterizes certain regions of this Nation.48  
The report also detailed measures in the years preceding 1965 that disenfranchised 
black Americans, including purging from eligible voter rolls, dismal voter 
registration rates, and issues related to the registration process, literacy, and civics 
tests.49  
The understanding of Congress that these measures targeted black 
Americans and that the VRA was to be a tool for greater enfranchisement could 
not have been clearer, and again, the House report is illustrative. Congress noted 
that previous legislative and judicial measures had been largely ineffective. It 
concluded,  
Such experience [of judicial relief] amply demonstrates that the case-by-
case approach has been unsatisfactory. . . . The burden is too heavy—the 
wrong to our citizens is too serious—the damage to our national 
conscience is too great not to adopt more effective measures than exist 
today. Such is the essential justification for the pending bill.50  
Given the resolve of some jurisdictions to continue to block black 
Americans from voting, legislation was needed because “[i]n widespread areas of 
several States tests and devices, as defined in this bill, have been effectively and 
 
46. I limit my analysis to congressional committee reports because they, with the exception of 
the bills themselves, tend to be most authoritative when interpreting legislative intent, and also to 
cabin the scope of my inquiry. “Committee Reports represent the most persuasive indicia of 
congressional intent in enacting a statute.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48:6 (7th ed. 2007). 
47. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 
315 U.S. 50 (1942). 
48. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 8 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2440–41.  
49. Id. at 10–12.  
50. Id. at 10–11. 
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repeatedly used to deny or abridge the right of Negroes to vote.”51  
The legislative history for the 1982 amendment confirms a congressional 
interest in guarding the rights of racial and language minority voters. The House 
report accompanying the amendment is informative on this point. Under a section 
entitled “Progress Under the Act,” the House reported triumphant gains in both 
voter registration and the election of candidates of choice.52 However, it also 
limited the extent of the VRA’s success, noting that  
these gains are fragile. The registration figures for minorities remain 
substantially lower than those for white voters. 
 The number of minority elected officials is still a fraction of the total 
number of elected officials; there are many jurisdictions with large 
minority populations which have no minority elected officials and which 
have never had any.53 
The report then explained that the gains made by candidates of color were 
generally limited to local positions, and noted the influence of racially polarized 
voting to their success.54 It concluded this section remarking, “At the same time, 
discrimination continues today to affect the ability of minorities to participate 
effectively within the political process.”55 It is worth noting that in the 1982 
amendment, Congress described a concern about discrimination against more than 
black Americans. The House report specifies discrimination against minorities in 
general. The broadening of congressional concern is most likely explained by the 
1975 reauthorization of the VRA, during which Congress added Section 203, a 
provision designed to address discrimination in voting against language 
minorities.56 In the 1982 changes, Congress continued to articulate a need for the 
VRA based on discrimination against voters of color, leaving the issue of white 
Americans’ voting rights entirely unaddressed. 
The most recent reauthorization of the VRA in 2006 echoed many of the 
same sentiments as the 1982 Amendment. One of the explicit congressional 
findings in the House report accompanying the bill stated, “However, vestiges of 
discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by second generation 
barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the 
electoral process.”57 Congress additionally found that the existence of racially 
polarized voting meant that racial and language minorities remained politically 
vulnerable and warranted the ongoing protections of the VRA. It also cited several 
 
51. Id. at 13.  
52. Voting Rights Act Extension, H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 7–8 (1981) (Report together with 
Supplemental and Dissenting Views, accompanying H.R. 3112). 
53.  Id. at 7–8. 
54. Id. at 10. 
55. Id. at 11.  
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(e) (2011) (defining “language minorities” as “persons who are 
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage”). 
57. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 2 (2006). 
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examples of continued discrimination since 1982, including actions taken by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to block discriminatory election practices, a number 
of judgments denied by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and 
DOJ litigation to enforce the VRA.58 The report stands for the proposition that as 
recently as 2006 Congress maintained the view that the VRA was intended to 
ensure the rights of racial and language minorities at the polls, while the question 
of whether white Americans were protected under the VRA remained 
unaddressed. It is worth noting that the Senate report also provided reasons for a 
broad interpretation. Senators Cornyn and Coburn submitted additional views 
expressing concern because the Section 5 coverage formula needed to be updated 
to avoid constitutionality issues. Reading the VRA broadly to ensure its ongoing 
constitutionality is explored in Subpart D.  
There is a plausible argument that the congressional intent behind Section 2 
was to protect all voters and not specific minority groups. Congress wrote the 
provision to cover all races in 1965. The fact that the 1982 amendment did not 
limit the class advances this claim because through the multiple reauthorizations, 
Congress had multiple opportunities—including one in 2006—to deliberately 
narrow the class of individuals it wanted to protect. Instead, it left the framework 
in terms of whom the Voting Rights Act is intended to protect untouched.59 In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held that the 1982 amendment to Section 2 was 
intended to broaden, not constrict the scope of the statute.60 One district court 
even concluded from this that “[f]rom the foregoing, it is manifest that Section 2 
broadly protects the voting rights of all voters, even those who are white.”61 
Although there is a reasonable argument that the congressional intent of 
Section 2 covers all voters, the legislative history strongly supports a narrower 
reading of the provision.  
D. Other Civil Rights Laws: Statutes In Pari Materia 
The next mode of statutory interpretation is to examine how courts have 
treated similar statutes, that is, statutes in pari materia. Congress adopted the VRA 
during a transformative time in American history when it passed many other civil 
rights statutes. Reviewing how courts have interpreted other similar statutes to 
include protections for white individuals may provide further context on how 
Section 2 should be read to ensure consistency among the nation’s 
 
58. Id. 
59. I recognize this argument may be limited because age and race are not socialized exactly 
the same. Although both characteristics are generally thought of as immutable in the present, age is 
thought of as something everyone will typically experience at some point, while race does not change 
as a result of time. Nonetheless, the argument still remains that Congress could have limited the class 
if it so desired.  
60. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991). 
61. United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446 (S.D. Miss. 2007).  
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antidiscrimination laws. A contrary interpretation would allow whites statutory 
protections with the exception of the federal voting rights context.  
The Supreme Court has a large body of case law interpreting civil rights 
statutes to include white plaintiffs.62 In 1978, shortly after the passage of many of 
the country’s groundbreaking civil rights laws, the Supreme Court heard the 
landmark Regents of University of California v. Bakke63 case, in which a white male 
who applied to University of California, Davis Medical School and was denied 
admission challenged the school’s admissions program that gave preference to 
economically and educationally disadvantaged applicants. Bakke challenged the 
program on the grounds that it violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which guards against discrimination by government agencies receiving federal 
funding, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles.64 The Court 
acknowledged that Title VI had historically ensured black Americans were not 
barred from federal financial assistance, and without pause concluded, “[w]e 
assume, only for the purposes of this case, that respondent has a right of action 
under Title VI.”65 Later cases brought by white plaintiffs challenging university 
admission policies continued this interpretation.66  
In addition to the Title VI context, the Court has also permitted white 
plaintiffs to bring challenges under Title VII, which protects against employment 
discrimination. For example, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company,67 
two white employees brought suit against their employer when they were 
discharged for mishandling cargo, but a black employee who committed the same 
offense was not. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, cited to the broad 
nature of the statute’s plain language68 and also referenced supporting legislative 
history.69 Ultimately the McDonald Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against whites as 
 
62. One example is in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Often cited for its 
holding on the summary judgment standard, Adickes’s underlying story was that a white schoolteacher 
brought suit against a restaurant that refused her service because she was in the company of black 
students. After it tracked the history of the Fourteenth Amendment as a response to the pernicious 
racism of the Ku Klux Klan, the Court ultimately held that “petitioner would show an abridgement of 
her equal protection right, if she proves that Kress refused her service because of a state-enforced 
custom of segregating the races in public restaurants.” Id. at 171. 
63. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
64. Id. at 278.  
65. Id. at 284.  
66. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (addressing a lawsuit where white plaintiffs 
challenged university admissions programs under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (same). 
67. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).  
68. Id. at 287 (“On the contrary, the statute explicitly applies to ‘All persons’ . . . including 
white persons.”). 
69. Id. at 289 (“[T]he immediate impetus for the bill was the necessity for further relief of the 
constitutionally emancipated former Negro slaves, [but] . . . the bill was routinely viewed, by its 
opponents and supporters alike, as applying to the civil rights of whites as well as nonwhites.”). 
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well as people of color.70 The Court’s later rulings in Title VII jurisprudence 
continue to allow white individuals to bring suits based on the statute, regardless 
of the underlying merits of the claim.71 
Given the direction of the case law in other civil rights contexts, a broad 
reading of the VRA is consistent with the broad reading of similar statutes that 
protect whites as well as people of color, a point further reinforced by the race-
neutral protections of the post-Reconstruction constitutional amendments and 
statutes passed to effectuate them.  
E. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
The canon of constitutional avoidance is another important doctrine of 
statutory interpretation that has appeared in a number of election law cases.72 
Because interpreting Section 2 to protect only voters of color raises Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection concerns, constitutional avoidance would argue for 
a broad interpretation that comports with the Act’s plain language. 
First articulated in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,73 courts have used 
the canon to dodge constitutional questions because “an Act of Congress ought 
not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction 
remains available.”74 Of the two possible interpretations of Section 2, only the 
broad reading is clearly constitutional.  
A narrow reading of Section 2 that protects some voters but not others on 
the basis of race, in contrast, might violate equal protection principles enshrined in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the Court holding that the VRA is “a 
legitimate response” to counter the evil of racism in voting.75 As recently as 2007 
the Supreme Court stated that “when the government distributes benefits on the 
basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict 
scrutiny.”76 Strict scrutiny means that the government actor “must demonstrate 
that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here under 
 
70. Id. at 280. 
71. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
72. See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 
SUP. CT. REV. 181 (2009), for an in-depth examination of two recent election law cases, Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (“NAMUDNO”), and 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (mem.) (asking the parties to file 
supplemental briefs on whether to overturn two of its precedents), 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), aff’g in part, 
rev’g in part 2008 WL 2788753 (D.D.C. 2008) (decided as Hasen article went to press), in the context 
of the constitutional avoidance doctrine.  
73. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).  
74. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chic., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).  
75. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
76. Id. at 720 (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005), as one of several 
cases standing for this proposition). 
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review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”77 
Strict scrutiny is justified for racial classifications because “racial classifications 
raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose,”78 such that an 
exacting standard of review “smoke[s] out illegitimate uses of race by assuring that 
[government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly 
suspect tool.”79 
A narrow VRA that protects only voters of color must survive strict scrutiny 
in order to pass constitutional muster. This challenge seems difficult given the 
exacting nature of strict scrutiny80 and the Court’s election law jurisprudence,81 but 
a compelling government interest can be framed. In this case, the interest would 
potentially be to protect and ensure the voting rights of historically 
disenfranchised black Americans and language minorities; in other words, 
eliminating racism against racial minorities in our elections would be the 
government interest at stake. This type of argument has been made before in 
many voting rights cases, such as Shaw v. Reno and Bush v. Vera.82 Given the 
fundamental nature of the right to vote83 and the country’s glaringly racist past at 
the ballot box, a court could find this to be a compelling government interest.  
Assuming arguendo a court does deem such an interest to be sufficiently 
compelling for strict scrutiny purposes, there is still significant doubt over whether 
a narrow interpretation of Section 2 is “necessary” to combat racism in American 
elections.84 One could claim that a narrow interpretation is narrowly tailored to 
combat the discrimination that was originally considered with the passage and 
 
77. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (citing 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
78. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).  
79. Id. at 506 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (first alteration in 
original)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“racial classifications are to be subjected to 
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations”). 
80. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (defining “conventional ‘strict scrutiny”’ as “scrutiny that is strict 
in theory, but fatal in fact”); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 806–08 (2006). 
81. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a North Carolina 
race conscious redistricting plan that proposed to create a second majority-black district). 
82. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 981 (1996) (“The United States and the State next contend 
that the district lines at issue are justified by the State’s compelling interest in ameliorating the effects 
of racially polarized voting attributable to past and present racial discrimination.”) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653–54 (“The state appellees suggest that a 
covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act. The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with 
the federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and applied.”).  
83. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“Though not regarded strictly as a natural 
right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society, according to its will, under certain conditions, 
nevertheless [voting] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”). 
84. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237 (“When race-based action is necessary to further a 
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the ‘narrow tailoring’ 
test this Court set out in previous cases.”). 
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subsequent reauthorizations of the VRA, but one factor the Court has weighed 
when considering the narrowly tailored element is whether the government has 
considered alternatives.85 Here, one could argue that a narrow Section 2 
necessarily has a more effective alternative: a broad Section 2. This alternative may 
be enough cause for a court to strike down a narrow Section 2 as unconstitutional. 
This point is particularly salient because a broad interpretation is a “workable race-
neutral alternative”—the kind the Court seemed to be referring to in Grutter—that 
still serves the VRA’s purpose. 
In reviewing several tools of statutory interpretation, the only one that 
compels a narrow interpretation of the statute is the VRA’s legislative history. It 
evinces a clear congressional intent to protect the rights of minority voters, and as 
recently as 2006, Congress, after compiling an exhaustive record, indicated it 
wanted to continue these protections for minority and language minority voters. 
The persuasiveness of legislative history should not be doubted. On the other 
hand, the statute’s plain language, examining statutes in pari materia, and the 
canon of constitutional avoidance favor a broad interpretation. Therefore, based 
on the total statutory analysis, the VRA should be read as extending to the claims 
of white voters. Furthermore, a broad interpretation is not at odds with the 
congressional intent during the VRA’s passage or subsequent reauthorizations 
because a broad interpretation can—and should—continue to enforce the voting 
rights of minority and language minority voters. Any argument that Section 2 
should not apply to white voters because it is not used enough already to protect 
racial and language minority voters is unconvincing. A broad interpretation of 
Section 2 does not mean that racial and language minorities will not be protected; 
rather, it only means more people can enjoy the protections of Section 2.86 Finally, 
even assuming that the legislative history is sufficient to overcome the other tools 
of statutory interpretation, the next Part examines several key policy reasons that 
lend further support for a Section 2 that protects the rights of all Americans. 
II. POLICY REASONS TO FAVOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 
This Part analyzes the policy reasons that favor a broad interpretation: basic 
fairness, the Act’s constitutionality, and the emergence of officially unrecognized 
 
85. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. . . . Narrow tailoring does, however, require 
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity 
the university seeks.”). 
86. I recognize that some DOJ Voting Section career attorneys and others were frustrated 
with United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009), and the administration’s handling of the Black 
Panther investigation because it seemed to them that the administration prioritized filing cases that 
protected white voters’ interests over the interests of traditionally marginalized groups. My argument 
only proffers that under a broad interpretation, these two do not necessarily need to be in conflict and 
are not mutually exclusive. The concern does raise a valid point about enforcement priorities from 
administration to administration.  
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minority groups who also deserve Section 2’s protections.  
A. Basic Fairness 
Regardless of the legal arguments proffered in support of or against a broad 
interpretation of Section 2, basic fairness dictates that white voters be offered the 
same statutory protections as black and language minority voters. Although a 
perverse and longstanding history of discrimination against blacks and language 
minorities exists in the voting context and is powerful and informative, this history 
does not necessarily justify reading the statute to exclude white voters. After all, 
systematically excluding white Americans from the VRA’s protections would seem 
to leave them without a statutory remedy if they faced some discriminatory act in 
the electoral process. Commentators have explained that the value behind a 
Section 2 remedy as amended in 1982 is that a claim can be filed under a results or 
effects test, whereas a constitutional remedy under the Fifteenth Amendment 
requires discriminatory intent, an element plaintiffs generally find more 
challenging to demonstrate.87 The example in the introduction of a rogue local 
party official purposely impeding the votes of white voters is a compelling one. 
Especially when reading the statute to apply broadly seems to pose no major 
difficulty, the possibility that white voters could potentially be left without a cause 
of action seems avoidable, undesirable, and counterintuitive to basic notions of 
fairness. Interpreting the statute narrowly would be the near-equivalent of unfairly 
neglecting white voters simply on the basis of their race. 
B. Ongoing Constitutionality 
It is also clear that a broad reading of Section 2 promotes its 
constitutionality. These arguments largely parallel the constitutional avoidance 
canon from Part I.  
As mentioned in that section, all government racial classifications are 
immediately suspect, subjecting the VRA to strict scrutiny analysis. Since its 
passage, the VRA has come under fire as proponents challenge Section 5’s 
ongoing constitutionality, claiming it is no longer a rational, congruent, or 
proportional means to enforce the Civil War Amendments. The idea that Section 
5 is no longer proportional and congruent was argued recently in Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO).88 Although 
NAMUDNO left Section 5 largely intact, as the Court resolved the issue on 
statutory grounds, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the majority hinted at what 
the Court would hold if forced to decide the substantive issue. Roberts wrote: 
 
87. Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent 
Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 745 (1983). 
88. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).  
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Things have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates 
now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees 
are rare. And minority candidates now hold office at unprecedented 
levels.  
. . . Past success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the 
preclearance requirements. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated 
in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. . . . The statute’s 
coverage formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, 
and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current 
political conditions.89 
Given Roberts’s language that “[t]hings have changed in the South,” it is 
clear that the VRA is at risk of being partially struck down in the near future. This 
opportunity may even be presented sooner than expected by the many ongoing 
cases challenging Section 5’s constitutionality.90 If any of these cases makes it 
before the Supreme Court as it is currently comprised, the Court may take the 
opportunity to strike down Section 5.  
Simply put, the recent constitutional attacks on the VRA mean that an 
immediately suspect narrow interpretation invites only further constitutional 
scrutiny. Such a move would also potentially raise the question of whether 
Section 2 is within congressional authority.91 Admittedly, the preclearance 
requirement of Section 5 and the nondiscrimination mandate of Section 2 are 
functionally different, but they respond to the same problem: racism in elections. 
If the Supreme Court determines that the preclearance requirement is no longer 
necessary to respond to this evil because the evil is weakened, such a move raises 
the question whether Section 2 is still necessary. The Court could decide that with 
the changing face of racism, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
sufficiently protect the right to vote and guarantee racism-free elections. 
Section 2’s constitutionality has been unsuccessfully challenged before, but those 
challenges were in light of the Court finding Section 5 constitutional. The Court’s 
analysis of Section 2’s constitutionality might look different if Section 5 no longer 
 
89. Id. at 2511–13.  
90. This argument is one of the key arguments in the current case Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 
10-0651, 2011 WL 4375001 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2011), on appeal to the D.C. Circuit after a district 
court’s careful opinion affirming its constitutionality. This was also the main claim in Laroque v. Holder, 
now revived after the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court’s standing decision. Laroque v. Holder, 
650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011). And Florida and Arizona have both announced they will join in 
challenging Section 5’s constitutionality. Rick Hasen, Now Florida Gets Into the Act of Claiming that Voting 
Rights Act Section 5 is Unconstitutional, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011 1:54 pm), 
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=24100. 
91. For cases examining this line of questioning, see Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 
(5th Cir. 1984) and United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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exists. Proponents of race-neutral policies, like the plaintiffs in the anti-affirmative 
action cases, would entertain raising Section 2’s constitutionality if the Court 
found unintentional racism as a negligible issue in today’s elections. Of course, 
even a broad interpretation might not be enough to save Section 2 in front of a 
skeptical, politically conservative court, but courts should be sure to not give 
anyone yet another reason to strike down a statute as important as the VRA.  
C. A Racially Complicated America 
Finally, a broad interpretation of the VRA comports with the reality of a 
racially dynamic America in 2012. It would also best effectuate the statutory goals 
given the seemingly arbitrary nature of government racial classifications.  
As discussed previously, America’s racial demographics have shifted from 
the 1960s, and the picture of race in America is increasingly complex. While a 
narrow interpretation of Section 2 would limit its protections to racial and certain 
language minorities, a broad interpretation would allow for the flexibility necessary 
to respond to our country’s new racial dynamics. For example, a broad Section 2 
helped the sizeable92 Arabic-speaking population residing in Hamtramck, 
Michigan,93 that was the target of discriminatory election practices in 1999.94 
Because Arabic is not a language covered by Section 203,95 the provision of the 
VRA protecting language minorities, bilingual election requirements were not 
triggered. Yet, previous incidents of discrimination had occurred against Arab 
voters. Challengers questioned the qualifications of only Arab voters, many of 
whom had dark skin and Arabic names, and even required some to take oaths as a 
condition to voting. In response, the DOJ filed a claim under Section 2, as well as 
 
92. As of 2000, Hamtramck’s population is over ten percent Arab, including Iraqi, Lebanese, 
and Bangladeshi Arabs. Department and Services: Demographics, CITY OF HAMTRAMCK: MICH., 
http://www.hamtramck.us/about/demographics.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).  
93. Conor Dougherty, U.S. Nears Racial Milestone: Whites Are on Verge of Becoming a Minority 
Among Newborns in Long-Expected Shift, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704312104575298512006681060.html (explaining that nonwhite minorities 
accounted for over forty-eight percent of the children born between July 2008–2009, and that 
minority births will soon eclipse births of whites of European ancestry); Minorities Expected to Be 
Majority in 2050, CNN, Aug. 13, 2008, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-13/us/census.minorities_ 
1_hispanic-population-census-bureau-white-population?_s=pm:us; Lisa Lambert, Number of ‘Majority 
Minority’ US Cities Grows-Brookings, REUTERS, Aug. 31, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/08/31/usa-states-cities-populations-idusn1e77u0wq20110831; Sam Roberts, In a 
Generation, Minorities May Be the U.S. Majority, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/washington/14census.html; Hispanics Become America’s New 
Majority Minority, NPR, Apr. 18, 2011, available at http://www.npr.org/2011/04/18/135517137/ 
hispanics-become-americas-new-majority-minority.  
94. For a more detailed treatment of the Hamtramck litigation and its limitations, see Jocelyn 
Friedrichs Benson, ¡Su Voto Es Su Voz! Incorporating Voters of Limited English Proficiency into American 
Democracy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 251 (2007) (discussing treatment of the Hamtramck litigation and its 
limitations).  
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(e) (2011) (defining “language minorities” as “persons who are 
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage”). 
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the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.96 A federal district court in August 
2000 agreed with the DOJ, ordered the city to establish a program to train election 
officials and citizens about election challenges and to place bilingual poll workers 
in Hamtramck on Election Day, and assigned federal observers to ensure 
compliance.97 If Section 2 applied only to those whom the government deems to 
be racial minorities, Hamtramck’s Arab Americans would be unable to file a claim 
under Section 2, rendering court-ordered relief under the statute basically 
impossible. 
The fact that Arab Americans are an unrecognized minority group means 
that Section 2 needs to be read broadly to help ensure that the voting rights of 
Arabs and other unrecognized vulnerable minority groups remain protected.  
D. Courts and Their Institutional Role 
Some might be concerned that a broad Section 2 would raise potential for 
misuse among indignant white voters and others. To prevent overreaching and 
abuse by any one particular group, courts are best situated to adjudicate claims 
under a broad interpretation of Section 2. They have both the statutory 
interpretation expertise as well as the knowledge about policy goals that can best 
effectuate the VRA’s objectives, and have navigated similar challenges in the past. 
One partial example of unintentional discrimination under Section 2 applying to 
non-black and language minority voters is the example discussed above of Arab 
Americans in Hamtramck, Michigan. Although the record demonstrated some 
incidents of racial discrimination against Arabs in the past, this factor arguably 
should not have been dispositive in the court’s analysis. In other words, because 
Arab Americans were not an enumerated group under Section 203 and therefore 
are not granted the same language access protections in elections, the DOJ needed 
to rely on the court’s broader interpretation of the VRA to fairly give effect to the 
statutory purpose.  
Under such a broad interpretation, some may argue that political forces 
could then manipulate Section 2 in such a way that the interests of white voters 
are prioritized over the interests of black and language minority voters, running 
against the VRA’s purpose. If courts allowed meritless VRA claims brought by 
white voters to proceed through legal channels, this would be problematic and 
perverse given Section 2’s long and inspiring history. Although such a trend is 
entirely possible, there is no evidence that courts would not meet these challenges 
with skepticism. Courts are asked to ferret out meritless and baseless claims in 
many other contexts, so their skills to do so effectively are to be depended upon in 
this regard. Courts are familiar with the VRA and its legislative purpose; indeed, if 
 
96. Benson, supra note 94, at 265–66 & nn.82–83. 
97. Consent Order and Decree at 6–10, United States v. City of Hamtramck (No. 00-73541, 
E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2000). 
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they are not, the record is plentiful and spans thousands of pages. Therefore, they 
should be entrusted to interpret the statute to best carry out the VRA’s goals. 
III. APPLYING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TO WHITE VOTERS 
IN PRACTICE 
Having explained why a broadly interpreted Section 2 is sound both as a 
matter of statutory interpretation and policy, this Part examines precisely how the 
VRA should work when applied to white voters. It first lays out the only case 
where Section 2 was applied to white voters, United States v. Brown, explaining both 
the factual circumstances giving rise to the litigation as well as the legal analysis. 
Then, it examines possible issues of intentional and unintentional discrimination 
in voting under a broad Section 2.  
As discussed earlier, Section 2 of the VRA prohibits any practice or 
procedure that results in the denial or infringement of the right to vote on the 
basis of race, defining the analysis under a totality of the circumstances test. The 
clearest instance of the need for Section 2 to apply to white voters arose in the 
case of United States v. Brown.98  
The events giving rise to the litigation merit some attention. The Department 
of Justice brought a Section 2 violation claim against Ike Brown, the Noxubee 
County Democratic Executive Committee (NDEC), and the Noxubee County 
Election Commission. For five years, Ike Brown was the chairman of NDEC, the 
entity responsible for performing all duties related to the qualifications of 
Democratic primary election candidates and for conducting the primaries 
themselves. According to the Department of Justice, chairman Brown 
impermissibly pushed a racial agenda of aggressively recruiting black candidates 
for office.99 In both 2003 and 2005 Brown encouraged black candidates who were 
either not residents of Noxubee County or residents of the particular ward to run 
against white incumbents, in violation of state law.100  
The court in U.S. v. Brown applied Section 2 after examining the history and 
case law of the Fifteenth Amendment and concluded that because the Fifteenth 
Amendment was intended to protect all voters and because the VRA was passed 
to effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment, the only logical conclusion is that VRA 
must be interpreted to protect all voters. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal. 
The district court found, “[W]hen Brown was chairman of the NDEC . . . , Brown 
not only recruited black candidates to run against whites with the aim of defeating 
white incumbents, but his plan involved the candidates’ falsely representing their 
 
98. United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 432 (5th Cir. 2009). 
99. Id. at 453.  
100. Mississippi Code provides that “[t]he mayor and members of the board of aldermen shall 
be qualified electors of the municipality and in addition, the aldermen elected from and by wards shall 
be residents of their respective wards” (emphasis added). MISS CODE ANN. § 21-3-9 (West 2011).  
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residency in order to qualify to run.”101 The court also noted Brown’s false 
accusations of racial discrimination, which he knew were unfounded.102 Most 
importantly, the opinion emphasized the Department of Justice’s main contention: 
Brown allegedly engaged in a complex scheme of absentee ballot abuses designed 
to minimize white voter participation in the 2003 Democratic primary.103 The 
court also cited evidence of improper assistance to black voters and disparate 
treatment of white candidates at the polls.104  
For all of these reasons, the district court concluded that the defendants 
violated Section 2 of the VRA, and the Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed this 
decision. Specifically on the question of the applicability of the VRA to guard the 
interests of white voters, the district court briefly explained that Brown presented 
an “atypical” VRA case because of the discrimination against white voters,105 but 
explicitly stated, “Section 2 provides no less protection to white voters than any 
other class of voters.”106 The court concluded, 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the essence of 
this Section 2 inquiry is whether the challenged “electoral law, practice or 
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an 
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and [majority] voters 
to elect their preferred representatives.” Such interaction simply does not 
exist when dealing with the voting rights of historically privileged white 
voters and who as a group do not suffer the effects of past 
discrimination. However, where the proof establishes a specific racial 
intent by black election officials to disenfranchise white voters, Section 2 
applies with ease.107 
Meanwhile, the circuit court opinion affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
failing to mention and taking for granted the legal analysis the lower court invoked 
to apply Section 2 to white voters.  
The district court’s legal analysis of the issue is sound.108 The opinion 
appropriately cites to Rice v. Cayetano,109 where a Hawaiian resident challenged a 
state voting scheme that restricted participation in the election of trustees to those 
of Hawaiian ancestry. The resident, Rice, brought a challenge under the Fifteenth 
 
101. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 453. 
102. Id. at 455. 
103. Id. at 455–70. The validity of the Department of Justice’s substantive allegations is 
outside of the scope of my inquiry, but the district court thoroughly examined the DOJ’s absentee 
ballot claim in precise detail in its opinion.  
104. Id. at 470–72. 
105. Id. at 444. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 486 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
108. This general conclusion is true even though Brown did not recognize the potentially 
conflicting interpretation of the legislative history behind Section 2. Instead, it simply cited to case law 
that supported the conclusions it made without acknowledging a more narrow legislative record.  
109. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).  
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Amendment, and the Supreme Court, using ancestry as a proxy for race, struck 
down the scheme.110 Although Cayetano is quickly distinguishable from Brown 
because the former involved only a constitutional claim and not a statutory claim 
under the VRA, like the district court indicated, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that Section 2 was passed to effectuate the nondiscrimination guarantees of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.111 Furthermore, if there were any doubt about the 
parameters of the Fifteenth Amendment prior to 2000, Justice Kennedy—writing 
for the majority in Cayetano—alleviated any concerns by offering extremely clear 
language explaining its scope. He wrote: 
There is no room under the Amendment for the concept that the right to 
vote in a particular election can be allocated based on race. Race cannot 
qualify some and disqualify others from full participation in our 
democracy. All citizens, regardless of race, have an interest in selecting 
officials who make policies on their behalf, even if those policies will 
affect some groups more than others. Under the Fifteenth Amendment 
voters are treated not as members of a distinct race but as members of 
the whole citizenry.112 
The district court in Brown also referenced Mobile, a Supreme Court decision 
where black residents of Mobile, Alabama, challenged the state’s at-large city 
commissioner voting scheme, claiming it unconstitutionally diluted the black vote 
and violated Section 2. The Mobile Court briefly analyzed the Section 2 claim, 
citing several sources of legislative history that showed Section 2’s uncontroversial 
nature since it was “almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A]mendment.”113 In 
progressing to the constitutional claim, the Court said,  
In view of the section’s language and its sparse but clear legislative 
history, it is evident that this statutory provision adds nothing to the 
appellees’ Fifteenth Amendment claim. We turn, therefore, to a 
consideration of the validity of the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment.114 
Although Thornburg v. Gingles115 replaced Mobile’s framework with regard to 
vote dilution analysis, what the case determined with regard to the relationship 
between the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 remains unchallenged today.116  
 
110. Id. 
111. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). 
112. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).  
113. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980); United Jewish Orgs., Inc., v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 
512 (1975).  
114. Id. 
115. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  
116. Interestingly enough, similar to Brown, the Mobile Court does not mention or grapple with 
a conflicting characterization of Section 2’s legislative history, one that frames Section 2 as a 
mechanism to empower black Americans systematically denied the vote. Framed narrowly, this 
account potentially cuts against the Court’s seamless transition from the VRA to the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  
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Furthermore, Brown’s reliance on United Jewish Organizations (UJO)117 
strengthens its Fifteenth Amendment conclusion. UJO granted standing to 
Hasidic voters in Brooklyn who claimed that as a result of New York City’s 
compliance with Section 5 of the VRA in drawing district lines on a racial basis, 
their voting power had been minimized and diluted.118 The state Attorney General 
responded that the voters, as either Hasidic or white voters, lacked standing to 
bring claims under equal protection and the VRA.119 The Second Circuit swiftly 
concluded that although plaintiffs lacked standing as Hasidic individuals,120 white 
voters had standing to bring their claims. The court wrote, 
There is no reason . . . that a white voter may not have standing, just as a 
nonwhite voter, to challenge a denial of equal protection as well as an 
abridgement of his right to vote on account of race or color . . . . 
regardless of the fact that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were 
adopted for the purpose of ensuring equal protection to the black 
person.121  
After explaining that white Americans tend to compose the majority in this 
country but can plainly constitute a minority in any state or political subdivision, 
the Court said, “to the extent that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments can 
be construed as extending the rights of minority groups, in a given situation that 
group may of course be white.”122 The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed UJO 
without addressing the Second Circuit’s conclusions on standing.123 If the VRA 
had already been clearly established to protect the rights of white voters at the 
time the court issued its opinion, the Second Circuit’s finding that the Hasidic 
groups had standing as white Americans would only be strengthened and deemed 
more intuitive.  
Although the Brown decision did not engage in statutory interpretation of 
Section 2, nevertheless its interpretation is useful. First, it is important to note that 
both the Brown Fifteenth Amendment approach and the statutory interpretation 
argued for in this note lead to the same result: Section 2 protects all voters. 
Second, although Section 2 derives its strength from the Fifteenth Amendment, 
that does not necessarily answer the question of how the statute should be 
interpreted. It is crucial that courts look to the traditional tools of statutory 
analysis examined here to determine Section 2’s scope. For example, if something 
in the plain language of Section 2 or in its legislative history cut in favor of a 
particular interpretation, this would be regarded as directly persuasive, as opposed 
to any argument based in the Fifteenth Amendment.  
 
117. United Jewish Orgs., 510 F.2d at 512. 
118. Id. at 521. 
119. Id. at 519 
120. Id. at 520–22. 
121. Id. at 521–22. 
122. Id. at 522. 
123. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
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An intentional discrimination claim under Section 2, such as the claim in 
Brown, is the strongest argument in favor of applying the VRA to white voters. 
Logically, victims of intentional discrimination—whether white-black, black-white, 
or any other possible permutation—deserve a recourse under law. Of course, they 
may bring a constitutional claim under Mobile, but it seems unsound to block white 
voters from seeking recourse under Section 2, especially when the constitutional 
claim and the statutory claim implicate different standards. That is, there is no 
reason why racial minorities should be afforded the protections of both the U.S. 
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act while whites have only the constitutional 
protection to their avail. In no other civil rights context is this odd inconsistency 
allowed.  
A more interesting question is the idea of unintentional discrimination. 
Because Section 2 defines the test as a totality of the circumstances inquiry, so 
long as a pattern or practice has led to an infringement or abridgement of the right 
to vote based on race—even if such a result was unintended—it is prohibited. 
This means that white vote dilution claims, similar to the ones raised in UJO, 
would be cognizable in jurisdictions where white Americans comprise a numerical 
minority. Although somewhat provocative, courts—as institutional guardians of 
individual rights—should hear these claims and, assuming they are procedurally 
valid, adjudicate them on the merits.  
CONCLUSION 
Those who believe in a narrow application of the VRA are not entirely 
unreasonable. The interpretation is most consistent with the legislative history. 
The Civil Rights Movement was a unique moment in our county’s history, and 
many viewed the legislation passed during that period as an indication that the 
United States’ historic struggle with race finally shifted toward progress. Applying 
Section 2 of the VRA to white voters who are discriminated against may seem 
counterintuitive given the long and pervasive history of disenfranchisement other 
communities faced; it may lead some to conclude falsely that whites face similar 
obstacles to what people of color experience.124 Furthermore, those who favor a 
narrow interpretation may argue that the legislative record in 1965 and subsequent 
reauthorizations and amendments demonstrate only a congressional intent to 
protect black and language minority voters; the records do not present any 
evidence of white voter oppression.  
Such an interpretation, while understandable, nonetheless is undesirable. The 
plain language of the statutory provisions militates in favor of a broader reading of 
Section 2. Additionally, the case law and its synthesis in United States v. Brown 
 
124. John Blake, Are Whites Racially Oppressed?, CNN, Mar. 4, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2010/US/12/21/white.persecution/index.html; Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Let’s Rescue the Race 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at A19. 
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interpret the VRA in conjunction with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
to apply specifically to white voters. Furthermore, other civil rights legislation, 
such as Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has been interpreted to 
include whites as well, so a broad interpretation would fall in line with other 
similarly situated statutes. Finally, a narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act 
presents serious constitutional concerns, especially as the VRA is poised on the 
defensive and remains vulnerable to attack, and it also fails to recognize the 
complexity of modern day race relations. For all these foregoing considerations, 
courts should interpret Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as applicable to any 
citizen; such an interpretation best effectuates the purpose of the VRA—
protecting the voting rights of all Americans.  
 
 
